Abstract: During the allocation of initial water rights, the asymmetric information and different water use goals between basin governor and regional water users usually result to unreasonable allocation and inefficient utilization of water resources. To improve the allocation and utilization efficiency, we propose a framework for optimal allocation of initial water rights based on bankruptcy theory from the perspective of the basin governor. We take into consideration the demands of regional and industrial users, regional impact factors and industrial impact factors. Upon obtaining the initial optimization scheme in the first stage, we establish the supervision mechanism according to the reward and punishment rules in the second stage. We applied the model to the initial water rights allocation in typical basins, and investigated the implementation and effectiveness. Results demonstrate that the proposed model could improve the allocation efficiency of water resources on one hand, and restrain the behavior of over-users on the other. Hence, the model could support the reasonable allocation and efficient supervision of initial water rights. The research finding is conducive for watershed managers to rationally allocate and utilize water resources.

Key words: initial water rights allocation, two-stage optimal model, improved bankruptcy allocation rule, verification and punishment mechanism, supervision mechanism