目前梯级水库在联合调度时由于补偿效益分配制度上的不合理，致使一些调节性能较好的电站在联合调度过程中得不到公正的对待，从而影响了这些电站对联合调度的积极性。针对上述问题，以三峡梯级和清江梯级五库联合调度为例，引入博弈论中的Shapley-Value法对联合调度所产生效益分配方法问题进行了探讨。结果表明：该方法不仅具有很强的操作性，并且在分配过程中充分考虑了调节性能好的清江梯级在系统参与调峰过程中的效益补偿，其分配结果对各参与方都是公平合理的，从而使各梯级都有参与合作的积极性，有利于实现梯级水库群总效益最优的目标。

Hydropower plants with good regulating performance were made reluctant to be engaged in the joint  operation of cascade reservoirs because of institutional irrationality in the distribution of compensation benefits for the reservoirs. Shapley-Value method of game theory was used to explore the approach of benefit distribution. The Three Gorges and Qingjiang cascade reservoirs were selected as case study. The result manifested that this method was practicable. The compensation for Qingjiang cascade reservoir which has good regulating performance was fully considered in the system of compensation. Fair and reasonable distribution could be achieved so that the reservoirs could take active cooperation to  boost an optimal benefit for all the reservoirs.