基于博弈论的省际水事纠纷预防机制研究

李浩, 黄薇, 梁佩瑾

长江科学院院报 ›› 2011, Vol. 28 ›› Issue (12) : 72-76.

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长江科学院院报 ›› 2011, Vol. 28 ›› Issue (12) : 72-76.
流域综合管理

基于博弈论的省际水事纠纷预防机制研究

  •  李浩, 黄薇, 梁佩瑾
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Prevention Mechanism for Interprovincial Water Conflict Based on Game Theory

  •  LI  Hao, HUANG  Wei, LIANG  Pei-Jin
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摘要

省际水事纠纷具有易发生、难调解的特点,以预防为主的纠纷协调方式能减少事后调解的危害和难度。尽管省际水事纠纷表现形式各异,但其本质是参与人之间利益关系的博弈过程。运用博弈理论提出了省际水事纠纷的演化发展分析框架,并结合鄂豫丹江荆紫关水事纠纷案例,具体分析中央与地方在修建水利工程避免水事纠纷方面的博弈演化过程。最后从信息收集、信息处理与分析、信息评估与预测、信息沟通及干预机制等方面提出了省际水事纠纷预防机制框架。 为省际水事纠绘的调处提供了依据。

Abstract

Interprovincial water conflict, by nature, is a gaming process around benefit among all parties despite its various tokens. Game theory is employed to analyze the evolution of interprovincial water conflicts, in particular, the evolutionary gaming process of addressing  water conflict between the central government and local government by constructing water conservancy projects. The water conflict at Jingziguan County which locates at the shared border  of Hubei, Henan and Shaanxi Provinces by the Danjiang River is taken as a case study. An effective prevention framework comprising mechanisms of information collection, information processing and analyzing, information evaluation and prediction, as well as communication and intervention is put forward. The prevention mechanism will diminish damage and improve efficiency rather than to mediate afterwards.

关键词

博弈论 / 省际 / 水事纠纷 / 预防机制

Key words

game theory / interprovincial / water conflict / prevention mechanism

引用本文

导出引用
李浩, 黄薇, 梁佩瑾. 基于博弈论的省际水事纠纷预防机制研究[J]. 长江科学院院报. 2011, 28(12): 72-76
LI Hao, HUANG Wei, LIANG Pei-Jin. Prevention Mechanism for Interprovincial Water Conflict Based on Game Theory[J]. Journal of Changjiang River Scientific Research Institute. 2011, 28(12): 72-76
中图分类号: TV213.4   

基金

长江科学院博士启动项目CKSQ2010076;中央级公益性科研院所基金项目CKSF2010004


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