随着人口持续增长、经济快速发展,水资源需求不断增加,同时环境变化引起用水需求和供水总量的不确定性增加,导致水资源供需错位态势加剧。基于水资源短缺且供需变化的客观实际,研究破产理论在流域水资源配置问题中的应用。采用比例准则(PRO)、同等收益准则(CEA)、同等损失准则(CEL)和调整比例准则(AP)解决不同供需情景下流域水资源配置问题,并评估破产准则应用稳定性,运用Fallback bargaining方法选择出一致满意的水资源配置结果。研究结果表明,每种情景下,AP准则的稳定性最优,PRO准则次之;而Fallback bargaining方法表明,PRO准则结果能达到一致满意。综合考虑2种方法的差异后,认为PRO准则结果为一致满意的结果。因此,分析不同供需情景下流域水资源配置问题,并提出破产准则与Fallback bargaining相结合的分析框架,能够为变化环境下流域水资源管理提供科学决策依据。
Abstract
Amidst population growth and rapid economic development, the demand for water resources is continuously increasing. However, the uncertain water demand and total supply caused by environmental changes have led to an intensified mismatch between water supply and demand. In view of this, the bankruptcy theory was applied to water resources allocation at basin scale. Four bankruptcy theory rules - the proportional rule (PRO), constrained equal awards rule (CEA), constrained equal losses (CEL), and adjusted proportional rule (AP) - are employed to address water allocation problems in the basin under various supply and demand scenarios. The stability of the bankruptcy criteria was evaluated. Additionally, the Fallback bargaining method was utilized to select consistent and satisfactory results. The findings indicate that the AP rule exhibits the best stability in all scenarios, followed by the PRO rule. The application of Fallback bargaining demonstrates that the results obtained by the PRO rule achieve unanimous satisfaction. In view of the disparity between the two rules, the PRO rule is considered to yield satisfactory result. Based on these findings, an analytical framework that combines the bankruptcy criterion and Fallback bargaining was established to offer a scientific decision-making basis for water resources management in changing basin environments.
关键词
水资源配置 /
供需变化 /
破产理论 /
Fallback bargaining
Key words
water resources allocation /
supply and demand change /
bankruptcy theory /
Fallback bargaining
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基金
国家社会科学基金一般项目(20BGL191);国家重点研发计划项目(2017YFC0404600);国家自然科学基金项目(71704068);教育部人文社会科学研究一般项目(21YJCZH139);江苏省社会科学基金项目(21GLB007)
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