针对目前水资源短缺及污染的加剧，水资源安全面临严峻挑战的形势，在总结国内外水资源安全研究的基础上，概况了具有代表性的水资源安全的定义和内涵；归纳了水资源安全评价中常用的指标体系以及评价方法。同时，本文也分析提出了水资源安全的定义及评价指标体系，并概括提出了目前水资源安全研究领域里存在的主要问题和发展趋势。

The study synthesized the literature related to water resources security released home and abroad, also summarized and represented the typical concepts and connotation for water resources security, as well as the indicator system and methods for its evaluation. Based on these, this article also proposed and established a concept and an indicator system for water resources security. At the final, the major issues needed to be studied further and the study trend of water resources security were pointed out in this article.

为研究三峡水库汛期调度方式优化问题,以实测资料为基础,对三峡水库蓄水运用以来入出库沙量特性变化进行了分析,主要从泥沙角度对三峡水库采用汛期“蓄清排浑”动态运用方式进行了初步探讨。研究结果表明:三峡水库蓄水运用后汛期入库沙量大幅减小,上游溪洛渡和向家坝水库蓄水运用后三峡水库汛期6—9月份含沙量已经开始小于论证阶段5月份和10月份的含沙量;三峡水库主汛期出库沙量占年出库沙量的90%以上,且汛期出库沙量主要集中在1~2次大的出库沙峰过程中;近期三峡水库汛期采用“蓄清排浑”动态运用的泥沙调度方式,泥沙淤积可许。研究成果可为三峡水库汛期优化调度提供参考。

In an attempt to optimize the dispatching mode of the Three Gorges Reservoir (TGR) in flood season, we analyzed the variations of inbound and outbound sediment discharge after the impoundment of TGR based on measured data, and preliminarily investigated into the dynamic operation mode of “storing clear water and releasing muddy water” in flood season in terms of sediment. Since the impoundment of TGR, inbound sediment discharge has reduced by a large margin in flood season; in particular, since the operation of Xiluodu reservoir and Xiangjiaba reservoir, sediment concentration in TGR in flood season (June to September) has been smaller than those in May and October of demonstration stage. Meanwhile, accounting for over 90% of the annual value, sediment outflow in main flood season mainly concentrated in one or two large sand peaks. In the near future, the dynamic operation mode of “storing clear water and releasing muddy water” in flood season allows for sediment deposition.

水库汛末提前蓄水调度具有主从递阶的决策结构，而发电目标的异参同效性使给定防洪规则时最优蓄水方案不唯一，即水库优化调度求解存在“不适定性”，水库运行管理单位是否选择对防洪安全更有利的蓄水方案影响调度效益的实现，表明防洪与兴利在竞争关系外还存在合作潜力。针对这一问题，围绕如何加强兴利部门对防汛部门的合作意愿从而提升水库调度整体效益，建立了基于下层决策者满意度的合作激励模型。该模型以不适定二层规划为框架，从水库调度决策特点出发，对兴利部门的合作意愿与其在给定防洪规则下的预期发电收益的非线性相关关系进行描述，进而得到兴利部门选择有利于防洪目标蓄水方案的概率，并采用多种群混合进化粒子群算法对模型求解。同时设置量化指标，对合作激励机制下的水库优化调度决策效率损失和整体目标实现度进行评估。在三峡水库汛末提前蓄水调度实例中，将新模型与乐观、悲观和部分合作模型结果进行了对比分析。结果表明，合作激励的机制会促使防汛部门适当让渡部分效益以提高水库蓄水发电效益，进而鼓励兴利部门选择更有利于防洪安全的方案，同时能较为显著地减少主从竞争博弈导致的调度决策效率损失。此外，与线性满意度模型相比，本文提出的非线性的满意度~预期调度效益值关系曲线更符合水库调度的实际决策特征。

Within the hierarchical decision structure of reservoir pre-impoundment operations， the parameter equifinality of hydropower generation leads to non-uniqueness of optimal solutions， i.e.， the “ill-posedness” of solving reservoir operation optimization problems. Under such circumstances， the realization of operation benefits is affected by whether the reservoir operator selects the refill plan in favor of flood safety， implying that not only competitive relationship but also cooperative potential exists between flood control and water conservation. In light of this， a cooperation incentive （CI） model based on the lower-level satisfaction is developed to provide a mechanism to promote the water conservation department’s cooperation with the flood control department and enhance the reservoir operation benefit. Based on the framework of ill-posed bilevel programming， regarding the actual decision characteristics， the model described the nonlinear correlation between the cooperation willingness and the expected benefit of the water conservation department given certain flood control rule， so that the probability of selecting the refill plan in favor of flood safety can be derived. The CI model is solved by using multi-swarm evolutionary particle swarm optimization algorithms. Quantitative indicators are proposed to evaluate the Pareto efficiency loss and overall goal achievement of the reservoir operation optimization under cooperation. In the Three Gorges Reservoir pre-impoundment case study， the results are compared with those of the optimistic， pessimistic， and partial cooperation models. Results show that the CI mechanism motivates the benefit concession of the flood control department to increase hydropower generation and encourage the water conservation department’s choice in favor of flood safety. Further， the efficiency loss in operation decisions due to competitive gaming process can be more prominently reduced. Findings also indicate that nonlinear satisfaction-expected benefit relationship can better describe the practical decision making in reservoir operation.